Drawing on existing theories of social exchange as well as self-categorization theory, we consider how two forms of direct exchange influence whether structurally disadvantaged actors choose to stay in the micro-structures that disadvantage them. We posit that (1) the exit opportunity is more likely to result in disadvantaged actors coming to view their network as a group if there has been a history of reciprocal, as opposed to negotiated, exchange and (2) this psychological group formation should account for disadvantaged actors disproportionately choosing to remain in reciprocal exchange networks. We also consider whether the information actors have about the alternative network affects this choice. Findings from two laboratory experiments generally support our argument that for disadvantaged actors, psychological group formation mediates the relationship between exchange form and staying in networks.
need for research on what motivates individuals to add or delete linkages in order to understand ''which power structures are self-perpetuating and enhancing vs. random consequences of change processes vs. the source of their destruction'' (Leik 1992:322) . Willer and Willer (2002) extended this idea by using network exchange theory to explain how rational, fully informed actors might improve or defend their power by adding or deleting linkages to others. They concluded that because adding links generally benefits those in low power positions, rational actors in low power positions should try to add linkages until networks become power balanced. To counteract this and maintain power, those in power advantaged positions should respond by limiting the ability of others to seek out new connections.
One way of accomplishing this is by creating a ''with us or against us'' scenario, whereby individuals must choose between existing and alternative sets of network ties. Although extreme, such situations do occur. Employers often demand the full commitment of employees, forcing them to choose between the current employer and alternative employers (Hirschman 1970; Kmec 2007) . Children sometimes do something similar when constructing friendship groups. Adler and Adler (1995) , for example, showed that joining a more popular friendship network sometimes means cutting ties with one's current set of friends. That it is possible to sever ties with one network in order to join a new one, however, doesn't address why those disadvantaged by the structure of the network might choose to remain in it.
One possible explanation for this hinges on gift giving and its underlying norm of reciprocity. Ongoing research by social exchange theorists finds that apart from the benefits to be had, the structure of reciprocal exchange can serve as an integrating force (e.g., Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Molm, Whitham, and Melamed 2012) that can motivate the development of psychological contracts or beliefs in the mutual obligation of self and other (Rousseau 1989; Rousseau and Tijoriwala 1998) . Building on this insight, we investigate how different exchange histories shape whether disadvantaged actors choose to stay in the very networks that disadvantage them. We theorize (1) that the exit opportunity is more likely to result in disadvantaged actors coming to view their network as a group if there has been a history of reciprocal, as opposed to negotiated, exchange and (2) that this psychological group formation should affect the exit choice. Thus, we add to the extant research on network stability by considering the underlying psychological processes that influence the staying behaviors of those who have the strongest material incentive to leave.
THEORY

Social Exchange
The social exchange perspective views human interaction as a series of resource exchanges between actors (Homans 1974) . A resource in social exchange is any capability or object that is held by one actor and valued by another. Exchange relationships form when the resources to be had from interdependently exchanging with others outweigh independent action (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) . That is, in the pursuit of valued resources, actors enter into recurring exchange relations with those who can provide said benefits.
Resource exchanges can take various forms. When the outcomes of exchange depend on the behaviors of actors who exchange with one another, an exchange relation is said to be direct, and there are two forms of direct exchange relations: negotiated and reciprocal.
Negotiated exchanges are those where actors bargain over the terms of the exchange and engage in an exchange transaction only after the terms of the exchange have been agreed on, such as those associated with buying a house or a car. Typically, social exchange researchers rule out opportunism by assuring that actors know about the quality of the resources to be exchanged (for an exception, see Kollock 1994) and making agreements binding (e.g., Cook et al. 1983) . Negotiated exchanges are characteristic of traditional markets, as exemplified by sports teams bargaining with one another over the terms of a trade and players bargaining with sports teams over the terms of a contract (for an example, see Lawler, Yoon, and Thye 2009) .
Reciprocal exchanges are those where actors independently initiate an exchange by providing a benefit to another, for example, swapping birthday presents. A lack of negotiation and binding agreement means that benefits flow unilaterally and that there is no assurance that giving will result in another's reciprocation, which makes these exchanges riskier than negotiated exchanges (e.g., Cheshire, Gerbasi, and Cook 2010; Molm 1994; Molm et al. 2007 ). Reciprocal exchange is an important characteristic of the network form of organization (Powell 1990 ) and a prominent feature of the 23 women's better-dress firms that Uzzi (1997) studied.
Although both forms of exchange occur directly between two actors, these actors may be embedded in more complex networks of exchange relations. Such exchange structures consist of the connections between a set of exchange actors and shape the mutual dependence of actors. Negatively connected network exchange structures are those structures where exchange in one relation precludes exchange in another on any given exchange opportunity. For example, if an individual wants to buy a car and he chooses to buy it from a certain dealer, this necessarily precludes buying the car from all other dealers. Power imbalances in such networks arise due to inequalities in dependence. When network alternatives result in one actor being less dependent on another actor for resources than the other actor is on him or her, a power imbalanced exchange relation exists, with the less dependent actor experiencing a power advantage (Emerson 1972) .
We consider why those disadvantaged by these structural conditions sometimes opt to stay in them and whether this choice is influenced by the form of exchange. Key to our argument is the mechanism of psychological group formation or the process by which someone comes to view himself or herself as part of a group of three or more actors characterized by increased cooperation and reduced levels of self-interest (Hogg 1992; Lawler and Yoon 1996) . In the following, we explain why a history of reciprocal exchange should make disadvantaged actors more likely to undergo psychological group formation when given the exit opportunity and thus stay in a negatively connected, power imbalanced network.
Form of Exchange, Group Formation, and Disadvantaged Actors Staying in Networks
The structure of exchange can have important consequences for the bonds that develop between actors (e.g., Kuwabara 2011; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008; Molm et al. 2007; Willer, Flynn, and Zak 2012) . Thye, Lawler, and Yoon (2011) , for example, have shown that by influencing exchange frequency, the positive emotions that result from exchange, and perceptions of network cohesion, two dimensions of exchange networks-the network-wide potential for exchange and the inequality of structural power-can affect whether actors who negotiate over the distribution of a resource are likely to come to view their exchange network as a group. Willer et al. (2012) offer a different insight, showing that generalized exchange systems, which involve indirect giving and receiving of benefits such that no individual receives benefits directly from the person to whom they gave, foster greater group identification than direct exchange systems and that this effect is mediated by the number of benefits exchanged.
This finding departs from the predictions of the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008) , which posits that because the jointness of exchange is not as explicit in generalized exchange as it is in the two direct forms of exchange and in productive exchange, actors in generalized exchange systems should be less inclined to develop a sense of shared responsibility for exchange outcomes, attribute emotions to the social unit, and thus form a sense of cohesion with the network.
1 While empirical research testing this idea shows that generalized exchange produces less network cohesion and group attachments than the other forms of exchange, it does not show a significant difference in group attachments for the two direct forms of exchange that we study (Lawler et al. 2008) .
Similarly, Molm and colleagues find that actors in negotiated and reciprocal exchange networks rarely describe their set of exchange relations as a ''group, a team, working together'' (Molm et al. 2007:234) . Rather, they view the bonds that exist between exchange partners as distinct and isolated units, with those embedded in reciprocal exchange networks expressing greater personal attractions for particular exchange partners than those embedded in negotiated exchange networks (Molm et al. 2007 ). This finding reinforces Hogg and Turner's (1985) claim that while personal attractions can serve as the basis for group formation, they are unlikely to influence group formation if the relationships are idiosyncratic and personal. So even though reciprocal exchange results in stronger bonds between pairs of exchange partners, namely, personal attractions, than negotiated exchange (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2006; Molm et al. 2007 Molm et al. , 2012 Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000) , actors in reciprocal exchange networks appear no more likely to view their networks as groups. We argue that the exit opportunity changes this by introducing into the situation a categorical distinction that can serve as the basis for an ingroup/outgroup distinction. Self-categorization theory assumes a social situation will motivate psychological group formation if (1) an individual's past experiences and present desires prepare him or her to use a perceived categorical distinction and (2) the individual thinks categorization minimizes intraclass differences relative to interclass differences in expected or stereotypical ways (Turner et al. 1994; Turner and Reynolds 2012) .
A history of reciprocal exchange is more likely to satisfy these conditions for disadvantaged actors than a history of negotiated exchange. Because disadvantaged actors experience negotiation as more conflict laden and less fair than reciprocity (Molm et al. 2003 (Molm et al. , 2006 , a history of negotiation should result in disadvantaged actors being less prepared to use the categorical distinction as the basis for psychological group formation. Moreover, because negotiation clashes with the friendship norms of welfare and fairness (Kurtzberg and Medvec 1999) , it should be easier for disadvantaged actors to minimize intraclass differences and view exchange partners as behaving in ''groupy'' ways if they had previously engaged in reciprocal exchange. Thus, we contend that when presented with the opportunity to defect to another network, those in reciprocal exchange networks will be more likely to use the categorical distinction made evident by the presence of an alternative network to undergo psychological group formation.
Hypothesis 1: The exit opportunity will be more likely to result in psychological group formation for disadvantaged actors in reciprocal exchange networks than in negotiated exchange networks.
We also suspect that perceptions of personal attraction will mediate this relationship. How resources are exchanged across the two forms of direct exchange results in reciprocal exchange being riskier, less conflict laden, and more symbolically valuable than negotiated exchange, and this results in greater feelings of personal attraction for specific exchange partners in reciprocal exchange networks (Molm et al. 2007) , with these effects holding for those disadvantaged by the exchange structure (Molm et al. 2000 (Molm et al. , 2012 . These differences in personal attraction, which we define as perceptions of social unity with a specific exchange partner, become relevant when actors become aware of the opportunity to join an alternative network insofar as they provide ''a cognitive criterion for common category membership'' (Hogg and Turner 1985:61) . This is likely because positive personal attractions amplify perceptions of similarity (e.g., Backman and Secord 1962; Hogg and Turner 1985) , thereby resulting in the minimization of intraclass differences relative to interclass differences (Turner and Reynolds 2012) .
Consequently, we contend that following the exit opportunity, disadvantaged actors will rely on their personal attractions as a basis for group formation. Because personal attractions differ across the two forms of direct exchange, personal attractions should mediate the relationship between exchange form and psychological group formation.
Hypothesis 2: When disadvantaged actors become aware of the opportunity to join an alternative network, their personal attractions for their respective exchange partners will positively affect whether they view their existing network as a group. Hypothesis 3: Personal attraction will mediate the relationship between exchange form and psychological group formation.
In addition to personal attractions, the amount of information disadvantaged actors have about the alternative may affect group formation. Hogg (2012) contends that the desire to reduce subjective uncertainty about the social world motivates individuals to think of themselves as group members so that they can form expectations about what they might gain from their interactions. Thus, the amount of information an actor has about an exchange network should affect perceptions of uncertainty (Savage and Bergstrand 2013) and consequently psychological group formation. A complete lack of information about the alternative makes it impossible for disadvantaged actors to compare the present network with the alternative, maximizing the uncertainty in their subjective worlds. Interestingly, the provisioning of additional, albeit incomplete, information about the alternative network does not improve the ability to determine whether the new exchange network will provide greater or lesser benefits. Still, the extra information might result in actors believing they are better
Should I Stay or Should I Go?
able to ascertain the benefits they will get from the alternative, thereby lessening perceptions of uncertainty and the motivation for psychological group formation. Thus, we introduce our fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Psychological group formation will be greater when the amount of uncertainty about the benefits provided by exchange relations in an alternative exchange network is high rather than low.
That the exit opportunity should differentially affect psychological group formation across the two forms of direct exchange matters because how strongly an individual identifies with a group should affect whether the actor stays in it. Previous research demonstrates that personal attractions are often poor predictors of behavior at units of analysis beyond the dyad and that a group identity is a better predictor of behaviors at the network level (Hogg 1992) . Thus, whether an actor chooses to remain in an existing exchange network or not should depend on whether the actor views the network as a group to which he or she belongs.
Hypothesis 5: Psychological group formation group will positively affect whether disadvantaged actors choose to remain in an existing exchange network. Hypothesis 6: Psychological group formation will mediate the relationship between the form of exchange and staying in an existing network.
We test these hypotheses with data from two controlled laboratory experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 involved undergraduate students who earned money by exchanging with two computer-simulated actors. The amount earned depended on participants' exchanges with partners. Implementation of random assignment in concert with various experimental controls ruled out the possibility of systematic variation across experimental conditions (Campbell and Stanley 1963) and allowed for a rigorous test of our predictions.
Design and Participants
Social exchange theory assumes actors value the resources of exchange (Molm and Cook 1995) . A precondition for participation in the experiment then was a desire for the resource of exchange. Thus, we recruited undergraduate students from a large, public university based on their desire for the resource in the experiment: money. The experiment manipulated the form of exchange (reciprocal vs. negotiated exchange) and the information subjects had about the alternative network (low vs. high information), thereby allowing us to evaluate our theoretical argument.
2 Sixty-four undergraduate students were randomly assigned to each of the experimental conditions created by crossing the form of exchange and the amount of information, so that there were 16 students per condition.
3
For control purposes, equal numbers of men and women were assigned to each condition. 4 2 In addition to the form of exchange and information, Experiment 1 manipulated power by placing participants in either high or low power conditions. While the manuscript focuses on the low power conditions, online Appendix A (available at spq.sagepub.com/supplemental) reports the results of a mediation analysis using the KHB method to examine the effects of power. This analysis reveals that power moderates the effects of psychological group formation on staying behavior; the effects are strongest for those in low power conditions. This finding strengthens our confidence in our argument.
3 Sixty-seven undergraduate students actually participated in these conditions. We excluded data from three subjects because they did not believe they were interacting with real people.
4 Sensitivity analyses found no gender effects.
Procedures
The experiment involved participants engaging in a series of exchange opportunities with two exchange partners in what they believed was a fixed, fourperson exchange network. While multiple subjects could participate in the experiment at the same time, no two subjects encountered one another during the experiment. Upon arriving, participants were directed to isolated rooms where they were told that instructions for the experiment would appear on the computer terminal once all participants had arrived.
Instructions informed subjects that they would be interacting with other students and the amount of money they earned would depend on these interactions. Unbeknownst to participants, exchange partners were simulated actors designed to mimic real exchange behavior. Simulated actors were used as a control to ensure that subjects had comparable earnings across the forms of exchange (mean = 1,235.88 in reciprocal; mean = 1,216.13 in negotiated; t test 62 = .60, ns). The instructions also taught participants how to use their computers to make exchanges. Participants were told that they would have two exchange partners who each had a common alternative partner. A diagram of this exchange network appeared on subjects' screens and can be seen in Figure 1 . Participants also learned they would be interacting with their partners over a series of exchange opportunities and that for any one opportunity they would only be able to exchange with one partner.
5 Subjects were aware of the potential benefits they could receive from each partner on each exchange opportunity and thus were aware that they had one high value (X) and one low value (Z) partner. The greater benefits potentially provided by X combined with the fact that X also had a high value relation with Y meant subjects were more dependent on X for resources than X was on them and as a result, at a power disadvantage. They were unaware of this.
After the instructions, subjects participated in a series of exchange opportunities with their two simulated exchange partners. The completion of each exchange opportunity resulted in participants receiving information about who gave them points and how many points they received. Total earnings were updated and reported. In order to reduce equity effects (Cook and Emerson 1978) and enhance the uncertainty associated with exchange (Molm et al. 2000) , subjects did not receive information about the profits earned by their exchange partners.
We divided the exchange opportunities into three phases, with the number of exchange opportunities in each phase varying by the phase and the form of Note: Subjects were told that they were W and that they could exchange with X and Z.
5 Subjects exchanged in negatively connected networks (Cook and Emerson 1978) . To operationalize a negatively connected network under conditions of negotiated exchange, actors could make an agreement with one, and only one, exchange partner on any given exchange opportunity. To do so in reciprocal exchange conditions, actors could only give to one exchange partner on any particular exchange opportunity.
6 These exchange networks are weak power network structures, because ''no position . . . is assured of being able to exclude another without cost'' (Markovsky et al. 1993:202). exchange. After completing 62 percent of exchange opportunities, the first phase stopped, and subjects were informed that they were partway through the experiment and asked to answer a few questions about their dyadic relationships and personal attractions for each exchange partner (Molm et al. 2007 ). After answering these questions, the second exchange phase began. It stopped after a predetermined number of exchange opportunities, with the number varying by condition. Here subjects were told that they had been randomly selected for a unique opportunity and that at some point in the next part of the experiment they would be able to interact with a new set of people should they want to stop interacting with the people with whom they had been interacting. The amount of information subjects received about this alternative network varied by condition. Subjects then were asked to answer questions designed to measure psychological group formation. The third exchange phase started upon completion of the questionnaire. After a number of additional exchanges, with the number varying by condition, subjects received the opportunity to join the alternative network. The experiment ended with the subject's choice to either join an alternate network or stay in their current network. All subjects were debriefed and paid.
Manipulations
Form of exchange. Participants engaged in either reciprocal or negotiated exchange. We manipulated these using exchange settings developed by Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi (1999) . Negotiated exchange conditions had subjects bargain with simulated exchange partners over the division of a pool of benefits. Subjects knew the range of points they could request from their exchange partners but did not know they were simply dividing a fixed amount of benefits when making requests, thereby masking how many points their partner received from exchange. On any given exchange opportunity, subjects negotiated for up to four rounds and were able to make offers, make counteroffers, or accept offers on each round. Each round had subjects request how many points they wanted to receive from their exchange partners, and the computer converted these requests into offers to the partners. Agreements occurred when an actor's request matched his or her partner's offer. If an agreement was made, the actor immediately received that amount. If an actor failed to make an agreement, the actor did not receive points for that exchange opportunity.
Reciprocal exchange conditions consisted of a series of exchange opportunities in which subjects had to select to whom they wanted to give points without knowing the choices of others. So, on any particular exchange opportunity, subjects made their selection without knowing if anyone was giving to them. Giving points did not result in the giver losing points from his or her total. At the end of each exchange opportunity, subjects were told who gave to them and how much they received. All analyses examine the effect of reciprocal exchanges by making negotiated exchange the reference category.
Steps were taken to ensure these two forms of exchange were as similar as possible. First, more exchange opportunities were run in reciprocal exchange conditions (160) than in negotiated exchange conditions (80). Each exchange opportunity in negotiated exchange conditions allowed for up to four rounds of bargaining, while each opportunity in reciprocal exchange consisted of a single act. Doubling the number of reciprocal exchange opportunities approximately equates the time and effort spent by participants across these two forms of exchange. Exchange opportunities were distributed across the three exchange phases with phase 1 consisting of 100 reciprocal exchange opportunities or 50 negotiated exchange opportunities, phase 2 consisting of 40 reciprocal exchange opportunities or 20 negotiated exchange opportunities, and phase 3 consisting of 20 reciprocal exchange opportunities or 10 negotiated exchange opportunities.
Second, the monetary values of points were adjusted to ensure comparable behaviors received comparable earnings across the two forms of exchange. The total number of points an actor could give to an exchange partner on any exchange opportunity in reciprocal exchange was equal to one-half the points that could be divided between actors in the negotiated exchange setting on each opportunity.
Amount of information about the exit opportunity. We randomly placed subjects in one of two information conditions. In the first condition, subjects were told they had an opportunity to exchange in an alternative network but received no information about the structural dimensions of the network. Importantly, the prompt emphasized that subjects could not predict beforehand whether leaving would result in better or worse earnings. In the second condition, subjects knew they had an opportunity to exchange in an alternative network and the only difference between their existing network and the alternative network would be the people with whom they interacted.
Programming of Simulated Actors
We modified a program used by Molm et al. (2006) for a previous social exchange experiment to create simulated actors. Modifications ensured simulated actors behaved in realistic ways, appropriate to their structural positions, and were informed by behavioral data from previous exchange experiments using only human subjects (e.g., Molm et al. 2000) .
Subjects had one high power simulated exchange partner (the focal partner) and one low power simulated exchange partner (the other partner) who each had another high power exchange partner in common. For both forms of exchange, the behaviors of the focal partner were set to disadvantage the low power participant, and the behaviors of the other partner were programmed to create, on average, equal value exchanges between the low power participant and the simulated actor. Interactions between participants and the focal partner disadvantaged the participant so that he or she received, on average, 5 points for every 7 points the simulated actor received from the subject. In the negotiated exchange conditions, this disparity between the participant and the focal partner was created by manipulating the number of points requested by the focal actor. The focal actor made initial requests of 7, 8, or 9 points, meaning subjects were only being offered 5, 4, or 3 points. If this request was not accepted, the request was lowered by 1 on the next round of negotiations and then repeated on all subsequent rounds. For each exchange opportunity, the high power simulated actor had a 20 percent chance of requesting 7 points, a 60 percent chance of choosing 8, and a 20 percent chance of choosing 9, resulting in an average initial request of 8 points and an average final request of 7 points.
7 Subjects who accepted a final request of 7 received 5 points.
To create this 5/7 split in reciprocal exchange conditions, the program manipulated the frequency with which the 7 There was a 10 percent chance of the high power simulated actor reaching an agreement with another simulated exchange partner. In addition to enhancing realism, including this feature helped make the negotiated exchanges more similar to the reciprocal exchanges, where high power simulated actors chose not to give to lower power participants. simulated actor reciprocated the subject's giving. Specifically, we adjusted the probability of the simulated actor giving after receiving and the probability of the simulated actor giving after not receiving. The probability of giving after receiving was set at .68, and the probability of giving after not receiving was set at .03. This created the desired ratio.
Interactions between the participant and the other simulated actor were designed to create, on average, equal value exchanges. In negotiated exchange, this was achieved by having the simulated actor request 2 to 4 points in the first round, lower this request by 1 in the second round, and then repeat this request for all subsequent rounds. On average, the final request was 2.
8 A modified tit-for-tat strategy created the desired ratio in reciprocal exchange. Here, the probability of the simulated actor giving after receiving was .85, and the probability of the simulated actor giving after not receiving was .15.
Measures
Personal attraction. We measure personal attraction with four items designed to evaluate how subjects assess each of their dyadic exchange relationships along these dimensions: divided/united, selforiented/team-oriented, coming apart/ coming together, and partners/adversaries (Molm et al. 2012 ). These measures ranged in value from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating greater attraction. From these items, a personal attraction measure was created for each participant for each exchange relationship. Averaging responses for the high value relation resulted in a scale with an alpha reliability of .88. A similar scale for the low value relation had an alpha reliability of .86.
Psychological group formation.
After subjects were made aware of the alternative network, they were asked to answer three questions designed to measure psychological group formation. The first item had subjects indicate whether they felt very unattached/very attached to the three other participants with whom they had been interacting (Bargozzi and Lee 2002) . The second item asked subjects to describe how much obligation (very little/very much) they felt toward these other participants (Bargozzi and Lee 2002) , and the third had subjects indicate the extent to which they felt a sense of belonging with this set of participants (Bargozzi and Lee 2002; Thye et al. 2011 ). All items ranged in value from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating greater levels of psychological group formation. The alpha reliability score for these three items was .84. A factor analysis with varimax rotation (not shown) of all of the items for the personal attraction measures and the psychological group formation measure produced a three-factor solution with the psychological group formation items loading on a unique factor and the personal attraction measures for the focal actor and the personal attraction measures for the other actor also loading on separate factors. We are therefore confident that although related to the personal attraction measures, the measure of psychological group formation is distinct.
Staying behavior. We measured staying behavior by having participants choose to join an alternative exchange network or not. Those who chose to stay in their existing network received a 1. Those who chose to leave received a score of 0.
Exchange frequency. Higher frequencies of exchange generate greater 8 We added realism to the experiment by having this low power simulated actor occasionally reach agreements with another simulated actor after the second round of negotiations. For each exchange opportunity, there was a 6 percent chance of this occurring.
relational cohesion between pairs of exchange partners, and the structure of exchange can affect exchange frequency (e.g., Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; Molm et al. 2000) . 9 Because the frequency of exchange might vary across the two forms of exchange and the two power conditions, we include exchange frequency as a control. We measure the exchange frequency at each phase of the experiment by dividing the number of agreements with (negotiated exchange) or acts of giving to (reciprocal exchange) the high value simulated actor by the total number of exchange opportunities.
10 Exchange with the high value partner is of utmost importance as participants experienced power differences through this relationship. Exchange frequencies ranged in value from 0 to 1 for each exchange relation. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by condition for the aforementioned measures. In line with expectations, mean scores for personal attraction, psychological group formation, staying intentions, and actual staying behaviors are generally higher for the reciprocal exchange conditions. The table also reports the exchange frequencies between subjects and their two exchange partners for the entire experiment. Across the two forms of exchange, the exchange frequencies between subjects and high power simulated actors were similar to those in an experimental study conducted with only human subjects (Molm et al. 2012) .
Results
Because these descriptive statistics are consistent with our expectations, we test our hypotheses more formally using a series of regression models. Our argument hinges on the idea that the exit opportunity prompts individuals to reflect Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
9
Our measure of exchange frequency had a relatively high correlation with earnings (r = .77). We therefore did not include earnings in the statistical models we present. Doing so, however, does not result in different conclusions. See online Appendix B available at spq.sagepub .com/supplemental for these results.
10
While our measure is consistent with that used by Molm, Collett, and Schaefer (2006) , an alternative way of constructing the measure for reciprocal exchange conditions would be to consider how often the participants received points from their focal partners. Our models are stable regardless of how we operationalize exchange frequency. See online Appendix B available at spq.sagepub.com/supplemental for these results.
back on their past exchange relations and that this reflection will result in disadvantaged actors being more likely to undergo psychological group formation if those past exchanges were characterized by reciprocal, as opposed to negotiated, exchanges. We also contend that personal attraction at the dyadic level will mediate the relationship between the form of exchange and psychological group formation.
The regression analyses in Table 2 begin to test these claims. Model 1 regresses psychological group formation on the form of exchange and the frequency of exchange between the subject and focal partner.
11 Results show only the form of exchange has a significant effect on psychological group formation, with psychological group formation being higher in reciprocal exchange conditions. Model 2 adds the two personal attraction measures. The significant main effects for both measures show that personal attraction affects psychological group formation, and Sobel-Goodman tests reveal that both attraction measures partially mediate the relationship between the form of exchange and psychological group formation, with personal attraction toward the high value partner mediating about 32 percent of the total effect and with personal attraction toward the equal value partner mediating about 21 percent of the total effect. These results provide support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3-following the exit opportunity, psychological group formation is stronger for disadvantaged actors located in a reciprocal exchange network and personal attractions for specific exchange partners partially mediate this relationship.
Next, we consider whether the amount of information actors have about the alternative network affects psychological group formation. Model 3 in Table 2 reveals that increasing the amount of information did not motivate greater Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. p \ .05 (two-tailed tests).
11 Analyses run using the frequency of exchange between the subject and other simulated actor as the control are generally consistent with those reported. The measure of exchange frequency included in the reported results was the average of the exchange frequency for the first two exchange phases. Sensitivity analyses reveal that only including exchanges that occurred during the first phase of exchange does not modify results. psychological group formation, as predicted by Hypothesis 4. We, however, note that because we did not assess uncertainty perceptions directly, we do not know how participants interpreted this information. Future research should more directly evaluate the effects of uncertainty.
Two questions remain: Does psychological group formation affect whether individuals ultimately choose to remain in their existing exchange networks, and does it mediate the relationship between the form of exchange and staying? Hypothesis 5 states that because individuals who view themselves as part of a group come to favor that group over other groups, disadvantaged actors should be more likely to choose to remain with their existing network the more they identify as a group member. A bivariate logistic regression analysis (not shown) yields support for this prediction. A oneunit increase in psychological group formation increases the odds of staying in the network by a factor of 4.60.
But does psychological group formation mediate the relationship between the form of exchange and staying in one's network as predicted by Hypothesis 6? We answer this question using the KHB framework, which was created to compare coefficients of nested nonlinear models (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013; Karlson and Holm 2011) . The KHB framework is a multistep procedure that first regresses the mediator on the exogenous variables and retains the residual. This residual then is included in a reduced model that does not contain the mediator, thereby ensuring that any difference between the model with the mediator (i.e., the full model) and the reduced model is attributable to the mediator. This process ensures that coefficients across models are measured on the same scale and thus, comparable. Table 3 presents the results of an application of the KHB method and the mediation analysis. Including psychological group formation in the model results The coefficients from this model differ from a standard logistic regression model because the residualized psychological group formation measure is included in the model, thereby making the coefficients in this model comparable to those in Model 2. We do not report the coefficient for the residual here.
in a significant reduction in the main effect of the form of exchange on the choice to stay in one's network, as predicted by Hypothesis 6. In fact, psychological group formation explains 43 percent of the effect of the form of exchange on staying. This finding holds even after controlling for power, information, and personal attraction. We were surprised that including psychological group formation in the model resulted in the coefficients for the two personal attraction measures becoming significant and negative. Hogg (1992) contends that personal attractions are often poor predictors of behaviors at the group level, and as a result, we did not expect there to be a significant relationship, much less a significant negative relationship. The small sample size and the relative lack of variation in the outcome for the negotiated exchange conditions, however, may have affected the stability of our models and may account for this finding. We therefore ran another logistic regression using the Firth method as a sensitivity check. The Firth method, which maximizes a penalized likelihood function, is an efficient modeling strategy for dealing with small-sample bias (Firth 1993) . Results are in Table 4 . They reproduce the findings reported using the KHB method, with the exception that the personal attraction measures are no longer significant, as we would expect. Thus, we are confident in our conclusions that disadvantaged actors in reciprocal exchange are more likely to stay in their networks and that this is in part because they are more likely to undergo psychological group formation following the exit opportunity.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Our argument is that the opportunity to join an alternative network motivates psychological group formation for those in reciprocal exchange networks but not those in negotiated exchange networks and that this difference in group formation explains differences in staying behaviors. While results from Experiment 1 generally support this, the design of Experiment 1 prevents us from ruling out the possibility that differences in psychological group formation across the two forms of exchange simply reflect differences in how people respond to reciprocal and negotiated exchange, rather than how they respond following the exit opportunity. Experiment 2 attends to this possibility by examining whether psychological group formation differs across the two forms of exchange absent the exit opportunity. If our argument is correct, we would expect there to be no difference in psychological group formation across these two forms of exchange.
Design and Participants
Experiment 2 was a two-condition experiment that manipulated the form of exchange (reciprocal vs. negotiated). Thirty-six undergraduate students were randomly assigned to each of these two conditions. We use data from 34 of these because 2 students were suspicious about whether they were interacting with real people. Each condition had 12 women and 5 men.
Procedures
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 involved participants engaging in a series of exchange opportunities with two exchange partners in what they believed was a fixed, four-person exchange network. The procedures were similar to those used in Experiment 1. The major difference was that after a set number of exchange opportunities, Experiment 2 simply ended and participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire evaluating the extent to which they identified with the network as a group.
Similar to Experiment 1, there were more exchange opportunities in reciprocal exchange conditions (100) than in negotiated exchange conditions (50), and monetary values of points were adjusted to ensure comparable behaviors received comparable earnings across the two forms of exchange. These steps were taken to ensure the two forms of exchange were as similar as possible. Finally, the programmed behaviors of the simulated actors were the same as in Experiment 1.
Measures
Psychological group formation. We relied on the same three items to measure psychological group formation. Thus, our measure captures whether participants felt (1) attached to the other members of the network, (2) a sense of obligation to the other individuals, and (3) a feeling of belonging with the other individuals in the network. The alpha reliability for these three items was .77.
Exchange frequency. The primary control variable for this analysis was the frequency of exchange. Again, we measured the exchange frequency by dividing the number of agreements with (negotiated exchange) or acts of giving to (reciprocal exchange) the high power simulated actor by the total number of exchange opportunities. Exchange frequencies ranged in value from 0 to 1 for each exchange relation.
Results
To see if the form of exchange affected psychological group formation absent the exit opportunity, we regressed psychological group formation on the form of exchange controlling for exchange frequency. Table  5 presents this analysis. Neither variable was significant at the .05 level, which is consistent with previous research that fails to show a difference in group identification across these two forms of exchange (Lawler et al. 2008; Molm et al. 2007 ). This finding strengthens our argument that it is the exit opportunity that
Should I Stay or Should I Go?
introduces into the situation a categorical distinction that under the right conditions serves as the basis for disadvantaged actors' psychological group formation.
DISCUSSION
Much has been said about the bonding power of the gift. Mauss (1925) , for example, observed that gifts have both a material and symbolic value that obligate gift recipients to repay the favor. More recently, social exchange theorists have investigated how the different forms of exchange affect the solidarity that develops between two actors (Kuwabara 2011; Lawler et al. 2008; Molm et al. 2007 ). They find that those forms of exchange that more closely resemble gift giving result in stronger dyadic bonds than those that more closely reflect market-based exchanges (Kuwabara 2011) . This is consequential given the prevalence of both reciprocity and negotiation in the real world (for accounts of reciprocal exchange among contractors in the New York garment industry, see Uzzi 1997 or Moore 1978 ; for accounts of negotiated exchanges over contracts in college coaching, see Greenberg 1991; for descriptions of families that differ in the use of either reciprocal or negotiated exchange, see Collett and Avelis 2011) .
Our research builds on this work by examining whether a history of reciprocal exchange makes disadvantaged actors more likely to stay in exchange networks than a history of negotiated exchange. It shows that the greater personal attractions produced by reciprocal exchange prime disadvantaged actors such that they are more likely to view themselves as group members following an exit opportunity. Thus, in addition to the network-wide potential for exchange and the inequality of structural power (Lawler et al. 2014; Thye et al. 2011) , our research points to the exit opportunity as another factor that can motivate psychological group formation for disadvantaged actors so long as it is primed by an appropriate exchange history. This is important because group identification mediates a significant portion of the effect of exchange form on disadvantaged actors' staying behaviors. What makes this finding different from past research documenting how personal attractions can explain an actor foregoing potentially advantageous exchange relationships with other partners in closed networks (Lawler and Yoon 1996) is that we make the network our unit of analysis and thus turn to social rather than personal attractions as the psychological basis for commitment.
Consequently, we speak to an apparent contradiction in the social exchange literature. While Emerson (1972) argues that power imbalances in exchange processes should produce pressures toward structural change through coalition formation and network expansion, Blau (1964) suggests that power imbalances could become institutionalized and resistant to change. We account for these contradictory assertions by showing how the form of exchange can influence the likelihood of an alternative structural change mechanism: exit. Unlike coalition formation and network expansion, which involve simply modifying linkages within a network structure, exit involves severing ties with all members of a network and thus is another factor to consider when investigating how people respond to structural disadvantage. Thus, we add to the literature on network dynamics by uncovering how one's exchange history informs how people respond psychologically to the exit opportunity. Past theorizing and research on the stability of exchange networks considers how uncertainty and the desire to accumulate resources informs the addition and deletion of particular linkages between actors in a network (e.g., Dogan et al. 2009; Emerson 1972; Kollock 1994; Willer and Willer 2000) . Our research is different in that it examines situations where disadvantaged people choose to extract themselves from whole networks rather than particular exchange relations, and it explores how the form of exchange affects this choice through the psychological process of group formation. Based on our findings, we conclude that in addition to structural power, future investigations into network dynamics should adopt a more holistic account of the social structure by considering the form of exchange and its effects on group formation.
Our findings also cast a shadow on the value of reciprocity. While Molm and colleagues convincingly demonstrate that integrative bonds between exchange partners are stronger in pure reciprocal exchange than in pure negotiated exchange (e.g., Molm et al. 2007 Molm et al. , 2012 , our research reveals that this can result in disadvantaged actors foregoing opportunities to improve their situation. Exactly because reciprocity veils issues of fairness by reducing conflict (Molm et al. 2003) and heightens the expressive value of exchange (Molm et al. 2007) , it increases the likelihood of disadvantaged actors adopting an attachment to the network that can retard structural change. Thus, reciprocity as an integrating and stabilizing force may increase the likelihood of actors making choices that reinforce their disadvantage.
To know the generalizability of this claim, additional research is necessary. We examine one particular power-imbalanced exchange network. Research on negotiated exchange relations, however, shows that variations in the structural properties of the exchange network can affect group formation (Thye et al. 2011) . It remains to be seen whether the findings generated here will hold in other powerimbalanced network structures, and future research should investigate this possibility.
Furthermore, our results indicate that psychological group formation only partially mediates the relationship between form of exchange and network retention, suggesting the possibility of other mechanisms. One additional mechanism may be perceived risk. Previous scholarship finds risk to be higher in reciprocal exchange than in negotiated exchange (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009) . Given that people are loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) , this may contribute to whether people forego joining an alternative network. Yet another possibility is that perceptions of hope for better future exchange relations may vary across these two forms of exchange and influence whether individuals stay. Schilke, Reimann, and Cook (2015) showed that low
